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Legal Uncertainty and 
Contractual Innovation
nnovative contracts are important for 
economic growth, but when firms face 
uncertainty as to whether contracts will be 
enforced, they may choose not to innovate. 
Legal uncertainty can arise if a judge interprets the 
terms of a contract in a way that is antithetical to the 
intentions of the parties to the contract. Or sometimes 
a judge may understand the contract but overrule it for 
other reasons. How does legal uncertainty affect firms’ 
decisions to innovate? In this article, Yaron Leitner 
explores issues related to legal uncertainty, particularly 
the amount of discretion judges have and the types of 
evidence they consider.
Innovation — which is important 
for growth and prosperity — is inher-
ently uncertain. When a firm launches 
a new product, it faces uncertainty 
regarding the product’s success. Simi-
larly, when two firms (or individuals) 
enter a contract containing novel 
terms, they face uncertainty as to 
whether the contract will be enforced 
in court. In other words, they face 
legal uncertainty. New contracts are 
important for economic growth as 
they enable the coordination of novel 
activities and relationships; however, 
when firms face legal uncertainty, they 
may choose not to innovate.1
Legal uncertainty can stem from 
the fact that the judge interprets the 
contract differently from the parties’ 
intentions when they entered the 
contract. It can also stem from “active 
judges” who understand the contract 
but overrule it for some other reason, 
such as concerns for third parties who 
might be affected by the underlying 
arrangement.  
How does legal uncertainty af-
fect the new contracts we enter? How 
can courts affect legal uncertainty and 
firms’ decisions about whether to inno-
vate? I will explore these questions and 
related issues in this article. In particu-
lar, I will focus on the amount and type 
of evidence judges consider and the 
amount of discretion judges have.
AN EXAMPLE OF LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
Let’s begin by illustrating legal un-
certainty that results from an interpre-
tation of a word. Even a simple word 
such as mandatory can sometimes be 
ambiguous. Take the case of Eternity 
Global Master Funds Ltd. (“Eternity”) 
against Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany of New York and JP Morgan 
Chase Bank (“Morgan”) in 2002.2 
Eternity lent money to Argentina (it 
purchased Argentina’s bonds) and 
protected itself against the risk that 
Argentina would fail to meet its debt 
payments by purchasing credit swaps 
contracts from Morgan.3 The contracts 
between Eternity and Morgan incorpo-
1 Negotiable debt instruments and the limited 
liability corporation are examples of contractual 
innovations that have been important for 
economic growth, yet subject to significant legal 
uncertainty.
2 The following description is based on the 
court’s rulings. See Eternity Global Master Fund 
Limited v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of 
N.Y. and JP Morgan Chase Bank, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of N.Y., 
October 29, 2002, and June 5, 2003.
3 Credit swaps are a common way for lenders 
to protect themselves against the risk that a 
borrower will default. These swaps usually work 
as follows:  The buyer promises to pay fixed 
periodic payments. In return, if a third party 
defaults, the seller pays the buyer the loss due 
to the default.  Thus, you can think of the seller 
as providing the buyer with long-term insurance 
against default in return for an annual insurance 
premium. In our case, Eternity was the buyer, 
Morgan was the seller, and Argentina was the 
third party.  Business Review  Q2  2005   27 www.philadelphiafed.org
rated terms from the 1999 ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions published by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA). In particular, the 
contracts said that Morgan would pay 
Eternity should a “credit event” occur, 
and the definition of a credit event 
included a few scenarios capturing the 
idea that Argentina will fail (or has 
failed) to meet its originally agreed-
upon debt obligations.4 
A dispute between Eternity and 
Morgan came up when Argentina, fac-
ing financial problems, announced a 
“voluntary debt exchange,” in which it 
offered its lenders the opportunity to 
exchange their debt for new loans with 
less favorable terms. Eternity argued 
this was a credit event, whereas Mor-
gan maintained it was not. The judge, 
of course, had to decide.
The problem was that the defini-
tion of a credit event in the contract 
did not explicitly raise the possibility 
of a voluntary exchange, but it did 
raise the possibility of a mandatory 
exchange, which, according to the 
contract, qualified as a credit event. 
Morgan argued that since Eternity had 
the option of not exchanging its debt, 
the exchange was voluntary rather 
than mandatory; therefore, a credit 
event had not occurred. In contrast, 
Eternity argued that “mandatory” 
should be read to encompass situations 
that are “economically coercive,” and 
therefore, Argentina’s exchange offer 
qualified as a credit event. Eternity 
might have meant, for example, that 
even though, in principle, it had the 
option of not exchanging its debt, in 
practice, it had to do so because oth-
erwise Argentina would not have paid 
anything on its original debt.
The judge, interestingly 
enough, presented two different 
views. At a first trial, he did not 
take a stand on the word manda-
tory and, instead, used a different 
reasoning to rule that a credit 
event had occurred.5 However, at 
a later trial, he reversed himself, 
saying that “upon further 
study, the court believes its 
analysis was incorrect.” This 
time, he ruled that a credit event 
had not occurred, basing his decision 





Innovation May Not Take Place.  
When a firm is not sure whether a 
new technology will succeed, it may 
sometimes choose to stick with an old 
one, even though the new technol-
ogy might be more efficient. Similarly, 
when the contracting parties are not 
sure how courts will interpret a new 
contractual term, they may choose not 
to incorporate it into their contract 
and, instead, use terms that are more 
familiar. In other words, they may 
choose not to innovate.
To illustrate the point above, go 
back roughly 200 years, and consider 
the following example: As the owner 
of a small business, you try to raise 
money to finance a project that looks 
very promising. The bank is willing to 
lend you some money but requires that 
you post the building and machines 
as collateral. This means, of course, 
that you cannot sell those assets with-
out permission from the bank. It also 
means that if you default, the bank 
will take immediate possession of the 
assets; so it knows it will get its money 
back. But there is one problem: The 
amount the bank is willing to lend you 
is only half of what you need. What 
will you do?
One option is simply to forget the 
project. Another option is to create 
a new type of mortgage contract that 
will allow you to raise more money 
without exposing the bank to too 
much risk of not getting its money 
back. One way to do it is for you to 
increase the amount of collateral you 
can post, say, by putting up your entire 
business as collateral; in particular, you 
will pledge not only the assets you own 
today but also the assets you may own 
in the future, such as inventories or 
accounts receivable. Since this creates 
more collateral, the bank will be will-
ing to lend you more, so that you will 
have all the money you need to take 
on the new investment opportunity.
Sound like a good idea? In 
principle, it does. But unfortunately, 
the bank is not willing to lend you the 
extra money, saying it does not want 
to take the risk that the courts will not 
enforce this innovative contract.
In a working paper, Julian Franks 
and Oren Sussman discuss two cases 
in which companies entered contracts 
similar to the one above. The ultimate 
outcomes were very different, however. 
The first case occurred in Eng-
land in 1870. A steamship company 
called the Panama, New Zealand, and 
Australian Royal Mail Co. borrowed 
4 Incorporating standard terms, such as those 
published by the ISDA, is an example of 
boilerplate or off-the-shelf text that reduces 
writing costs as well as legal uncertainty.
5 He ruled that the exchange qualified as a credit 
event because there had been an agreed-upon 
deferral of payments. 28   Q2  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
money using its “undertaking and all 
sums of money arising therefrom” as 
collateral.6 When the case came be-
fore the courts, the judge interpreted 
“undertaking” as covering all of the 
assets owned by the company at the 
time of default. According to Palmer’s 
textbook on company law, the judge 
essentially recognized that a mortgage 
can be placed not only on an object 
currently owned by the company but 
also on a class of assets that may be 
acquired in the future.
The second case occurred in the 
U.S.7 It involved a loan made in 1839 
from Winslow to a cutlery manufac-
turer. The borrowing company used 
the “machinery, tools and imple-
ments…which we may anytime pur-
chase” as collateral for the loan. When 
the company went bankrupt, Winslow 
took possession of some of the machin-
ery, tools, and stock in trade that were 
mortgaged to him under the original 
contract. Mitchell filed suit on behalf 
of all of the other creditors, claiming 
that Winslow was not entitled to the 
property and that the mortgage instru-
ment was not valid because it was on 
goods that were not yet in the posses-
sion of the manufacturer. A state judge 
dismissed Mitchell’s claim, arguing 
that the mortgage was properly regis-
tered and disclosed. However, superior 
courts later accepted the claim that 
this type of collateral, “the floating 
lien,” was not a valid instrument, argu-
ing that a mortgage could be secured 
only on current (existing) property. 
If new property were acquired, a new 
mortgage had to be taken out.8 It took 
nearly 100 years before the restrictions 
against this type of security were abol-
ished in the U.S.
In both the U.S. and England, 
these initial rulings had lasting effects 
because they became precedents for 
subsequent courts.
New Contracts May Set Ineffi-
cient Standards.  When previous rul-
ings set precedents for future rulings, 
subsequent firms face less legal un-
certainty than the innovators.9 Thus, 
the contract written by the innovators 
need not be the best one for those who 
use it afterward. Nonetheless, these 
followers may stick with the tried-
and-true contract because judges will 
enforce this contract consistently.
To illustrate this, return to the 
previous example in which you wanted 
to borrow against your entire busi-
ness. In practice, debt contracts often 
include covenants that give the bor-
rower a fixed period of time to get 
back into compliance. In many cases, 
the borrower has one or two months 
to remedy an initial breach of contract 
and avoid default. This gives the bor-
rower more time to come up with the 
funds and thus reduces the chances 
that the creditor will seize the borrow-
er’s assets if the borrower breaches the 
terms of the covenant. 
More generally, in theory, we can 
think of contracts that specify the 
probability that the lender will be able 
to take control of the borrower’s assets 
if the borrower defaults. In particular, 
in our example, suppose that rather 
than saying that if you default, the 
lender automatically takes control of 
your business, you want to say that the 
lender will take control only in half of 
the cases in which you default. In the 
other half, you will keep control, even 
though you have failed to pay. (This 
other half might correspond to cases in 
which you breached the contract but 
eventually came into compliance.) In 
some cases, such a contract may be op-
timal both for the borrower and for the 
lender.  The lender is happy because 
the threat of losing the business gives 
the borrower the incentive to put a 
lot of effort into running the business, 
which, in turn, increases the prob-
ability that the borrower will be able 
to pay back the loan. The borrower is 
happy because he gets some protection 
against bad luck — situations in which 
he was unable to make a payment, 
even though he put a lot of effort into 
the business.10
Now suppose the contracting 
parties think there is a 50 percent 
chance the court will not enforce their 
contract. Assume that, in that case, 
the lender will not be able to take 
control of the business. Then it may 
be optimal for the parties to enter a 
contract that does not reflect their 
true intentions. The reason is that if 
they enter a contract that reflects their 
true intentions (saying that the lender 
takes control only in half of the cases 
in which the borrower defaults), and 
the court enforces it only half of the 
time, the lender will effectively gain 
control only in a quarter of the cases. 
If, on the other hand, the parties enter 
a contract that says if the borrower 
6 According to the Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary, “undertaking” means the business of 
an entrepreneur.
7 Mitchell v. Winslow, 1843.
8 Jones v. Lewis Richardson, 1845. 
9 In practice, rulings made by high courts usually 
bind lower courts, but a single ruling of a lower 
court need not become a precedent for other 
courts.
When previous rulings set precedents for 
future rulings, subsequent ﬁrms face less legal 
uncertainty than the innovators.
10 Simply transferring control to the lender will 
not generally be efficient. The assets are often 
more valuable in the borrower’s hands; however, 
the lender may care only about his own share.www.philadelphiafed.org
defaults, the lender always takes con-
trol, and the court enforces it only half 
of the time, the lender will effectively 
gain control in half of the cases. This 
is exactly the outcome the contracting 
parties intended when they entered 
the contract, even though they speci-
fied something else in the contract.
The problem, according to Franks 
and Sussman, is that if previous rulings 
become precedents for future rulings, 
once the court enforces the first con-
tract, firms in the future may prefer to 
enter exactly the same contract, rather 
than incur the cost of revising it. This 
is because by doing so, they can avoid 
legal uncertainty — they know the 
judge will enforce the contract. Con-
sequently, entering a contract that 
says “always transfer control” may 
become the standard, even though the 
outcome involved is optimal only for 
the innovating firm and not for other 
firms. 
THE EVIDENCE COURTS 
CONSIDER CAN AFFECT 
INNOVATION
We have seen how legal uncer-
tainty can negatively affect the inno-
vation process. Legal uncertainty, in 
turn, may depend on the way courts 
act when they face a new contract. 
Different judicial practices can either 
facilitate innovation or stand in its 
way.
 One feature of a judicial process 
that might affect legal uncertainty 
is the amount and type of evidence 
courts can use to interpret an am-
biguous contract. A British judge, for 
example, often won’t take account of 
evidence of informal promises different 
from the explicit contractual terms. 
However, the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which governs commercial 
transactions in the U.S., directs a U.S. 
judge to consider such evidence when 
explicit contractual terms are vague. 
The Uniform Commercial Code also 
captures the idea that an agreement is 
to be read in light of the parties’ previ-
ous transactions (“course of dealing”). 
This raises many questions: 
Should courts consider evidence of 
prior negotiations between the parties 
to interpret an ambiguous contract?  If 
so, should courts be allowed to consid-
er prior negotiations to decide whether 
the language is actually ambiguous?
More Evidence Can Help the 
Judge Interpret the Agreement… As 
part of our current research agenda, 
Mitchell Berlin and I have investigated 
these issues as well as related ones. We 
start by assuming that when compa-
nies introduce new contractual terms, 
they face legal uncertainty; they can 
never be sure how courts will interpret 
their contract. This, as we have al-
ready seen, can keep firms from inno-
vating. We also assume that when the 
judge considers more evidence, such as 
prior negotiations or course of dealing, 
he is more likely to “rule correctly.” In 
other words, he is more likely to guess 
correctly the intentions the contract-
ing parties had when they entered the 
contract.11 This can motivate firms to 
innovate new contracts because the 
legal uncertainty they face is reduced. 
What we have in mind are con-
tracts that specify future payments. 
You can think of the insurance con-
tract between Eternity and Morgan or 
the mortgage contract from the previ-
ous section. We assume there is no 
disagreement between the two parties 
when they enter a contract. In other 
words, they agree on what should hap-
pen in each possible scenario. Howev-
er, at a later stage, when one party has 
to pay, he may prefer to go to court, 
hoping the judge will not enforce the 
contract because of misinterpretation. 
…But May Make It Harder to 
Build Precedents. While looking at 
more evidence may help the judge 
interpret the contract correctly, it 
may not be good for everyone. As in 
the previous section, what’s optimal 
for the first firms that innovate may 
not be optimal for subsequent firms. 
In the previous example, precedents 
not only reduced uncertainty but they 
also induced subsequent firms to use 
inefficient contracts. In our case, the 
problem is that precedents may not 
be established at all. If the court uses 
evidence that is too case specific, sub-
sequent firms or individuals using the 
same contractual term may not learn 
how the judge will interpret the novel 
term in their case. This is because the 
evidence used in the first case may 
not apply in other cases. If, instead, 
the court does not use case-specific 
evidence to interpret the contract, 
it needs to set a precedent, that is, 
a broader ruling that ap-
plies not only to the case 
under dispute but also to 
other cases. In this way, 
 
11 Thus, we differentiate between the written 
contract and the implicit agreement that reflects 
the parties’ intentions. The assumption is that 
the judge is more likely to rule correctly when he 
looks at evidence that tells something about the 
specific agreement.30   Q2  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
legal uncertainty is reduced for subse-
quent firms.12  
An interesting implication of the 
tradeoff above relates to the speed 
with which the innovation is adapted: 
When judges look at more case-re-
lated evidence, the innovation pro-
cess may start earlier, but it may take 
more time for the innovation to be 
widely diffused. The intuition behind 
this result is that the higher the legal 
uncertainty firms face, the less likely 
they are to incorporate new terms into 
their contract. This is because they 
always have the alternative of sticking 
with familiar terms and old standards. 
When the judge is more likely to rule 
correctly because he looks at more evi-
dence, it may be easier to find a com-
pany willing to be the first to innovate. 
That’s why the innovation process 
may start earlier. However, after the 
first innovation is brought to court, it 
may not become easier to find another 
firm that will use the new terms. Thus, 
the innovation spreads slowly to other 
firms. If, on the other hand, the judge 
did not use evidence to interpret a 
contract, it could be more difficult to 
find a firm willing to take the first step 
and use an unfamiliar term. However, 
once a case is brought to court and 
the judge makes a broad ruling, more 
firms are likely to use the new term 
because they are faced with less legal 
uncertainty.
Irrelevant Evidence May Make 
Innovation More Costly. The as-
sumption that more evidence helps the 
judge interpret the contract may de-
pend on the process by which evidence 
is collected. In the civil law countries 
of Europe (e.g., France), the judge is 
in charge of collecting evidence; so 
he can make sure that only evidence 
relevant to the case is collected. In 
contrast, in the U.S., lawyers are in 
charge of collecting evidence. They 
need to collect all evidence before the 
trial begins; therefore they try to col-
lect as much evidence as possible. In 
his article, John Langbein suggests that 
this process can lead to inefficiencies 
because lawyers may choose to col-
lect evidence that is not relevant to 
the case, and that can lead the court 
to make wrong decisions. To prevent 
these mistakes, the contracting par-
ties may try to write very detailed 
contracts. But when new contracts are 
very different from old ones, doing so 
may make innovation more costly.13 
The example above shows how 
legal uncertainty can lead to very 
detailed contracts. However, in some 
cases, legal uncertainty can actually 
lead to contracts that are not as de-
tailed as they could have been. (See 




Another factor that may affect 
legal uncertainty, and thus the in-
novation process, is the amount of 
discretion judges have when they face 
a contract that is not ambiguous. In 
England, judges have been formal-
ist, adopting an attitude of deference 
toward the contractual agreements of 
private parties.14 For example, when 
the London Pressed Hinge Company 
Limited failed in 1905, the judge con-
centrated control in the hands of debt 
holders — even though he thought 
it was unfair to do so — because this 
was what the contract said. The judge 
was concerned about other creditors 
that might be harmed, particularly 
suppliers or trade creditors, who were 
too weak to contract on their own, 
and whose junior position in the case 
of default was not a result of a deliber-
ate contracting decision, but rather a 
result of their failure to contract at all. 
Nonetheless, the judge ruled in favor 
of debt holders because he thought 
they obtained their rights in a lawful 
and valid contract.15 
In contrast, in the U.S., judges 
have been more active, in the sense 
that they intervened in the innovation 
process, sometimes in blunt violation 
of contracted agreements.16 We have 
already seen one example in which 
the courts in the U.S. voided a con-
tract, arguing that a mortgage could 
be secured only on current property. 
Another example relates to the fail-
ure of the Wabash Railway in 1884. 
Here, courts in the U.S., wanting to 
preserve the railroad as a going con-
cern, violated the debt contract by 
allowing Wabash to appoint two of its 
own directors as those who would take 
control of the firm’s assets.
Franks and Sussman suggest that 
the different rulings in the U.S. and 
England were caused by the differenc-
es in views about the appropriate role 
of judges, rather than the differences 
of opinion. In both cases, the judges 
thought it was unfair to concentrate 
control in the hands of a single person 
(for example, by pledging the whole 
12 Thus, a judicial precedent  is a public good. 
 
13 According to many observers, contracts in 
the United States are much more detailed than 
contracts originating in the civil law countries of 
Europe. Langbein’s article discusses a number of 
theories as to why this might be so.
14 The English corporation was granted the right 
to contract freely by a series of Acts of Parlia-
ment between 1848 and 1856 (the Limited 
Liability Act), consolidated in the Companies 
Act of 1862.
15 See Franks and Sussman.
16 The U.S. Constitution has allocated the power 
to innovate new insolvency procedures away 
from the parties and into the hands of Congress 
and the federal government. (According to 
Article 1, Section 8, of the 1789 Constitution, 
“Congress shall have the power…to establish…
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States.”)  Business Review  Q2  2005   31 www.philadelphiafed.org
business as collateral). However, they 
intervened in the U.S., but not in Eng-
land. According to Franks and Suss-
man, this difference in approach helps 
to explain why English bankruptcy law 
is more creditor oriented (its principal 
focus is to make sure debts are paid), 
while American law is more debtor 
oriented (its principal focus is on res-
cuing firms in distress).17
An important issue, then, is how 
much discretion judges should have. 
Unfortunately, there is no clear an-
swer. However, economists have begun 
to explore some of the tradeoffs.
Active Judges Can Protect Con-
tracting Parties from Unforeseen 
Contingencies. In a recent working 
paper, Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, 
and Andrew Postlewaite consider a 
model with active judges. They show 
that in some cases, active judges, who 
are allowed to void contracts, can 
actually reduce the legal uncertainty 
the contracting parties face, thereby 
reducing the risk of innovating. In 
particular, by voiding contracts, courts 
can protect the contracting parties 
from “unforeseen contingencies.” The 
idea is that the contracting parties 
cannot think of everything; so enforc-
ing the contract “as it is” may subject 
them to very high cost in situations 
that could not be foreseen when the 
contract was entered. One example 
they mention is the case of Spalding & 
Sons, Incorporated v. The United States. 
Spalding had a contract to harvest 
timber on U.S. government land, and 
the Bureau of Land Management 
cancelled the contract after a fire on 
adjacent property required unforeseen 
remedial action. When the case was 
brought before the court, the court 
upheld the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment’s right to cancel. 
The problem, of course, is that 
before voiding the contract, the court 
must decide whether an unforeseen 
contingency has occurred. This may 
not always be that simple. Often, 
judges cannot rely on the contract-
ing parties to say truthfully whether 
a contingency was foreseen or un-
foreseen because once the issue has 
Legal Uncertainty Can Also Make Contracts More Incomplete 
H
ow legal uncertainty makes contracts more 
incomplete is illustrated in a working paper 
by Shurojit Chatterji and Dragan Filipovich. 
In their example, two individuals enter a 
contract that specifies which action each 
individual should take. The judge then en-
forces the contract. The problem is that the 
judge may choose actions different from those initially intended 
by the contracting parties, and this can impose a high cost on 
one of the two individuals. To hedge against this possibility, the 
individuals enter a contract that does not specify as much as it 
could. This gives the individual who can be negatively affected 
by an erroneous court ruling more flexibility to protect himself.
The logic behind this result builds on the idea that some 
intrinsic incompleteness — in this case arising from the judge’s 
difficulty in figuring out the intentions of the contracting par-
ties — can lead to further incompleteness. Douglas Bernheim 
and Michael Whinston show that when the contracting parties 
cannot specify some things in a contract, they may intentionally 
leave other things open, even though they could be specified at 
no extra cost. In their model, the judge can distinguish among 
some actions, but not among others. For example, he may be 
able to tell whether a university gave a faculty member a par-
ticular office or whether the faculty member obtained a wage 
increase. But he may not be able to tell whether the faculty 
member has put a lot of effort into providing services that ben-
efit the university (e.g., helping in the recruiting process). Thus, 
the contract between the university and the faculty member 
can specify the obligations of the university, but it cannot 
specify all the obligations of the faculty member. The judge will 
simply not be able to learn whether the faculty member acted 
according to the contract, and so he will not be able to enforce 
it. Thus, the contract between the university and the faculty 
member is intrinsically incomplete.
Bernheim and Whinston show that this intrinsic incom-
pleteness can lead to further incompleteness. In particular, 
the contracting parties may choose not to specify some of the 
university’s obligations, even though they could be easily speci-
fied in the contract and enforced by the judge. Choosing not to 
specify allows the university to punish the faculty member (say, 
by reducing his future pay raises) if the latter shirks his obliga-
tions. At the same time, it protects the faculty member from 
being maltreated by the university. 
The logic is as follows: If the contract specified all of the 
university’s obligations, the faculty member could go to court 
if the university reneged on its contractual obligations; how-
ever, the university could not go to court if the faculty member 
shirked because the court would not be able to tell whether 
he had, in fact, done so. In contrast, if the contract left some 
of the university’s obligations unspecified, the university could 
punish the faculty member if he shirked. If, instead, the univer-
sity reneged, the faculty member could punish the university 
by exerting less effort. Thus, overall, choosing to enter such an 
incomplete contract could be beneficial to both parties.
17 To learn more about the different bankruptcy 
procedures, read the paper by Julian Franks, 
Kjell Nyborg, and Walter Torous. 32   Q2  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
come to court, the parties’ interests 
are opposed. When judges mistakenly 
identify an event as unforeseen, judi-
cial discretion has a cost. Contractual 
remedies that the parties had know-
ingly agreed to when the contract was 
signed are undermined. Whenever 
agents are concerned that a contract 
will not be enforced, they are less 
likely to innovate.18
CONCLUSION
We have seen that when parties 
face legal uncertainty, they may choose 
not to innovate new contractual terms 
and instead stick with old standards. 
We have also seen that the way the 
court rules may affect the uncertainty 
the contracting parties face, which, in 
turn, may affect the innovation pro-
cess. For example, when courts look at 
case-specific (and relevant) evidence, 
legal uncertainty is reduced for the 
first firms that innovate. However, 
precedents are not established, so un-
certainty is not reduced for subsequent 
firms. 
We have also seen that allowing 
judges to overrule or void contracts 
may have ambiguous effects. On the 
one hand, doing so can protect the 
parties from unforeseen contingencies, 
and it can protect the interests of third 
parties. On the other hand, it opens 
the door to potential judicial mistakes 
that may undermine incentives and 
increase the legal uncertainty the par-
ties face. 
18 In another working paper, Anderlini, Felli, and 
Postlewaite suggest that voiding contracts can 
sometimes be good for the contracting parties 
because it protects them from the risk that one 
of them will have an information advantage. 
For example, I might be more willing to buy 
a car from you if I knew the court would void 
the contract if I found out that you “forgot to 
mention” the car was involved in an accident. 
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